Dual-use items: how broad will the CJEU’s definition be?
A training aircraft designed for civilian purposes can also qualify as a military item. That’s a conclusion emerging from the Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-538/25 (Flugzeugherstellerin) before the Court of Justice of the European Union. What does this mean for companies exporting goods from the EU?
Where is the line between a civilian and a military item?
CJEU Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta tackled this question in her September Opinion in Case C-538/25. The issue at stake is how to distinguish purely civilian goods from those that may constitute dual-use items, i.e. those capable of being used for both civilian and military purposes.[1]
The case concerns an Austrian manufacturer of a two-seater aircraft designed for basic civilian pilot training and aerobatic flying. The aircraft was neither engineered for military use nor equipped with any military components.
Nevertheless, in a decision of July 2024, the Austrian authorities blocked the export to Myanmar of three aircraft, the associated assembly technology and finished aircraft parts. The reason? The aircraft could potentially be used for military pilot training or converted for reconnaissance or surveillance purposes, and the recipient was the air force of a country accused of systematic human rights violations.
The dispute came before the Austrian Federal Administrative Court, which in turn requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on, among other things, the interpretation of the concept of a ‘dual-use item’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/821.
A narrow or a broad definition of dual-use
The Regulation defines dual-use items as goods (including software and technology) which can be used for both civil and military purposes. The difficulty is that the provision does not specify when exactly a given item meets this criterion.
The aircraft manufacturer advocated for a narrow interpretation, arguing that a broad reading of the concept would in practice capture any everyday object such as a ruler, glue, and even clothing or foodstuffs, thus rendering the export control regime unpredictable for businesses.
The governments of Austria, Belgium, Greece, Spain, France and the Netherlands, together with the European Commission, took the opposite view. In their opinion, security and strategic considerations require the definition of a dual-use item to be broad enough to allow them to adapt to evolving geopolitical threats.
Advocate General Ćapeta sided with the latter group. In her view, the earlier approach, which placed free trade above security considerations, reflected a different era. Current EU legislation, including Regulation 2021/821 itself, treats security and strategic interests on an equal footing with the principle of free trade, rather than subordinating them to it.
What matters is the capability for use, not the manufacturer’s intent
The central proposition of the Opinion is that the classification of an item as dual-use does not depend on what the manufacturer designed it for. What matters is solely whether the item is objectively capable of military use, which is assessed by reference to its physical and technical characteristics at the time of exportation.
The Advocate General also rejected any form of significance threshold. There is no need to demonstrate that the exported item would make a ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ contribution to the recipient’s military capabilities. It is enough that any link exists between the item’s potential uses and the armed forces of the third country in question.
In practice, this means that a training aircraft may be classified as a dual-use item simply because it is suitable for basic military pilot training. Even where that training is no different from civilian pilot training.
Why did the Advocate General reject the significance threshold? The Opinion suggests that she considered it impossible to reliably estimate the extent to which a given item would contribute to the combat capabilities of a foreign army. Such an assessment would require an analysis of the structure and organisation of a third country’s armed forces – a task that is practically unfeasible for both businesses and export control authorities alike.
Two distinct steps in the assessment
The Opinion draws an important distinction that brings clarity to the entire dispute.
Determining whether a given item qualifies as a dual-use item is an entirely separate matter from deciding whether its export requires authorisation or should be prohibited.
At the first step, the only relevant factors are the item’s objective physical and technical characteristics at the time of exportation, including the possibility of its being repurposed for military end-use. The identity of the recipient, the situation in the country of destination and the risk of the goods being diverted are all irrelevant at this point.
All of those circumstances – the recipient’s profile, the political situation in the country of destination, the risk of diversion – only become relevant at the second step. That is when national authorities decide whether, on grounds of public security or human rights, to impose an export authorisation requirement or to prohibit the export of an item not listed in the Annex to the Regulation.
In other words, classifying an item as dual-use does not, in itself, have any immediate practical consequences. It merely opens the door to an assessment of whether, in the particular case, there are grounds justifying an authorisation requirement or an export ban.
What this means for EU exporters
If the Court follows the Advocate General’s position, European exporters will need to rethink the way they approach the classification of their goods.
A civilian purpose will not shield goods from dual-use classification. An item designed and marketed for the civilian market may be classified as a dual-use item if it is objectively capable of any military use – including for training purposes
Absence from a control list will not guarantee safety. The fact that an item does not appear in the Annex to the Regulation, on the European Union Common Military List or on a national control list will not preclude an authorisation requirement or an export ban
A previous export approval will not secure this approval for the future. National authorities will assess security and human rights considerations anew on a case-by-case basis. An item whose export was approved several years earlier may be subject to a ban on a subsequent shipment if the situation in the country of destination changes
The recipient and the end use of the item will be relevant at the authorisation step, not at the classification step. The end-user’s profile, the situation in the country of destination and the risk of diversion will not affect whether an item is classified as dual-use – but they will determine whether its export requires authorisation or must be blocked
The Advocate General’s Opinion is not binding on the Court, but it typically has a significant influence on the final ruling. The judgment in this case will be binding on the referring Austrian court and, in practice, will also set the direction for interpretation by authorities and courts across the other Member States. A key question is what impact the judgment may have on the application of the catch-all clause in the day-to-day practice of export control authorities.
What to do now
Businesses exporting goods, software or technology from the European Union should check now whether their internal export classification procedures reflect the two-step test outlined in the Advocate General’s Opinion.
Recommended actions
Check whether the company’s goods classification is based solely on the product’s technical characteristics, or whether it incorrectly conflates classification criteria with the criteria decisive for the authorisation requirement
Verify whether compliance procedures provide for a periodic review of existing export authorisations in light of evolving political conditions in the countries of destination
Assess the risk attaching to civilian products with potential military applications, even where they do not appear on any control list. It is worth bearing in mind that such risk may materialise at the authorisation step rather than the classification step
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[1] In accordance with Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/821

